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Background: Centrally led performance management regimes using standard setting,
monitoring, and incentives have become a prominent feature of infection prevention and
control (IPC) in health systems.
Aim: To characterize views and experiences of regulation and performance management
relating to IPC in English hospitals.
Methods: Two qualitative datasets containing 139 interviews with healthcare workers and
managers were analysed. Data directly relevant to performance management and IPC
were extracted. Data analysis was based on the constant comparative method.
Findings: Participants reported that performance management regimes had mobilized
action around specific infections. The benefits of establishing organizational structures of
accountability were seen in empirical evidence of decreasing infection rates. Performance
management was not, however, experienced as wholly benign, and setting targets in one
area was seen to involve risks of ‘tunnel vision’ and the marginalization of other poten-
tially important issues. Financial sanctions were viewed especially negatively; perfor-
mance management was associated with risks of creating a culture of fearfulness,
suppressing learning and disrupting inter-professional relationships.
Conclusion: Centrally led performancemanagementmay have some important roles in IPC,
but identifying where it is appropriate and determining its limits is critical. Persisting with
harsh regimes may affect relationships and increase resistance to continued improvement
efforts, but leaving all improvement to local teams may also be a flawed strategy.
ª 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of the Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
As in other countries worldwide, the landscape of infection
prevention and control (IPC) in the English National Healthent of Health Sciences,
West, Leicester LE1 6TP,
-Woods).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Service (NHS) has been shaped in recent years by extensive
policy-driven performance management. Much of this recent
history in England can be dated to 2000, when a highly critical
National Audit Office report identified poor surveillance that
relied primarily on voluntary reporting and noted that
healthcare-associated infections (HCAIs) had become seen as a
problem to be regretted but tolerated.1 The policy in-
terventions that followed initially involved relatively gentle
moves that encouraged organizations to recognize the need forHealthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
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However, by the mid-2000s public concern about HCAIs had
grown, fuelled by media reporting, patient pressure groups,
litigation and complaints, and reputational damage associated
with specific cases of failings.3e5 In response, the Department
of Health seized the initiative for making change happen. From
this point onwards, performance management, led from the
centre, became a prominent feature of IPC in England (Table I).
The characteristics of this performance management are
similar to those used in other public services, including estab-
lishment of performance standards and measurement as well
as the introduction of incentives and sanctions.6 Healthcare
providers in England are now subject to multiple forms of
oversight and control. Surveillance of infection rates, standard
setting through the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE), public reporting, and target-driven ap-
proaches (for example, based on key performance indicators
for specific infections) accompanied by financial and reputa-
tional penalties have combined with a much more forceful
legal and regulatory framework.7e9
With the Health Act 2006, prevention and control of HCAI
became statutory duties for NHS trusts. These duties were
further strengthened by the Health and Social Care Act 2008,
which made it a legal requirement of providers’ registration
with the Care Quality Commission (CQC) that they comply with
a code of practice for HCAI.9 Providing for a range of punitive
sanctions, the code is in marked contrast to previous guidance,Table I
Selected policy events relevant to HCAIs in the UK, 2001e2011
Year Poli
2001 Mandatory surveillance of MRSA b
2001 Publication of first edition of ‘epi
2003 Report of the Chief Medical Offic
2004 Mandatory surveillance of Clostri
all ages in 2007
2004 Mandatory surveillance of orthop
2004 All NHS organizations required to
2004 Launch of cleanyourhands campa
ordinated by the National Patient
2004 Patient Safety Alert issued, mand
2005 Saving lives: a delivery programm
high-impact interventions based
2006 Health Act 2006: code of practice
for provider registration with reg
HCAI, and new code of practice o
2006 Visits by Department of Health im
2006 Chief Medical Officer makes Chie
infection data submitted by their
2007 Introduction of ‘bare below the e
2008 Health and Social Care Act 2008.
protect patients against HCAIs. N
2008 Prime Minister declares HCAIs a ‘
2008 Patient Safety First campaign
2008 National target to reduce C. diffi
2009 Some NHS organizations participa
that made a percentage of their
2009 Launch of Matching Michigan prog
2011 Mandatory reporting of Escherich
HCAI, healthcare-associated infection; MRSA, meticillin-resistant Staphylo
and control.which tended to have a somewhat voluntary character. It
specifies ten duties with which registered providers are ex-
pected to comply, including the establishment of systems to
manage andmonitor the prevention and control of infection, to
provide a clean and appropriate environment, and to ensure
that all staff are suitably educated. The CQC may inspect or
otherwise audit providers, and is able to impose a wide range of
sanctions in the event of non-compliance, up to and including
de-registration.
At the same time, other agencies and bodies have become
more actively engaged in IPC issues, especially since the 2012
Health and Social Care Act. These include (but are not limited
to) NHS England and its Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs),
who can enforce IPC measures through contracts and for whom
incidence of Clostridium difficile and meticillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is part of the CCG outcomes in-
dicator set reported to NHS England.10,11
Substantial reductions in HCAI rates in England have
occurred over the last 15 years.12 However, performance
management of IPC has been the focus of considerable concern,
not least because the broader literature has identified many of
the unintended consequences that tend to be associated with
‘targets and terror’ regimes.13e16 Yet the perspectives of
healthcare workers who are subject to these regimes have
remained largely neglected: the benefits and disadvantages of
performance management for HCAI have instead been ‘read
off’ surveillance data and other sources. Using qualitativecy event
acteraemia
c’, the national guidelines for preventing HCAIs
er, Winning ways: guidance to reduce HCAIs in England
dium difficile infections in patients aged >65 years, extended to
aedic surgical site infections
appoint a director of IPC
ign in England and Wales funded by Department of Health and co-
Safety Agency
ating placement of bedside alcohol hand rub
e launched to reduce HCAI, including MRSA campaign, involving
on the care bundle principle
for the prevention and control of HCAIs, introducing requirement
ulator, requirement for providers to ensure protection against
n infections
provement teams to acute hospitals
f Executive Officers personally responsible for the accuracy of
organizations
lbows’ guidance
Required registration with the Care Quality Commission: duty to
ew code of practice.
top priority’ and orders a programme of deep cleaning
cile infection by at least 30% by 2011
ted in CQUIN (Commissioning for Quality and Innovation) schemes
incomes dependent on demonstrating compliance
ramme
ia coli and meticillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus
coccus aureus; NHS, National Health Service; IPC, infection prevention
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of regulation and performance management relating to IPC of
healthcare workers and managers in English hospitals.
Methods
Two data sources (Source 1 and Source 2) were used. Source
1 involved case studies of two English NHS hospitals that were
chosen to reflect different organizational structures, patient
numbers, and C. difficile, MRSA, and mortality rates. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with a purposive sam-
ple of staff, including frontline staff sampled from eight wards
across the organizations, and key executive-level staff. All in-
terviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim, and
anonymized. A list of themes generated from a literature re-
view was used as an initial coding frame. Further themes were
generated inductively, using open coding and organization of
open codes into higher-order categories.17
Source 2 was a study of efforts to prevent central line in-
fections in 19 intensive care units (ICU) in England, involving
interviews with a purposive sample of staff within each
participating ICU.18 Data directly relevant to performance
management and IPC were extracted and used to build and
extend the themes identified from Source 1. Data from both
sources were then synthesized to form a single analysis.
Source 1 was designated as service evaluation under the NHS
Research Governance Framework; ethical approval for Source 2
was gained from Berkshire NHS Research Ethics Committee.19
Results
Source 1 included interviews with 41 staff members: 37
frontline staff including nurse consultants, matrons, ward
managers, nurses at all levels, healthcare assistants, and
infection control specialists, and four executive-level staff.
Source 2 included interviews with 98 individuals: the majority
were clinical staff, including consultant and registrar-level
physicians, service improvement leads, specialist nurses,
infection control practitioners, and managers. Across both
sources we identified themes relating to both positive and
negative consequences of performance management.
Positive impacts of performance management
Participants (especially but not only in Source 1) identified
several positive consequences of performance management,
including raising the priority of IPC, driving the establishment
of formal structures and lines of accountability, making IPC a
collective responsibility, and generating data to drive
improvement.
Raising the priority given to IPC
External pressure to improve as a result of centrally driven
performance management had been felt throughout all orga-
nizations, and was identified by participants as having stimu-
lated action that had improved patient care. Some participants
argued that changes would not have occurred without the
external pressure, since there had previously been insufficient
internal imperative within organizations to prevent and control
infection appropriately. The use of financial and reputational
sanctions was identified by participants as especially importantin attracting the attention of senior management and
increasing the priority afforded to IPC.
One of the great successes obviously in infection control was the
reduction targets, they were very top-down and you will do this.
And if you don’t we’ll potentially fine you and we’ll name and
shame you and the chief executive who’s responsible. And they
worked. (Infection control nurse, Source 1)
Certainly five or ten years ago people weren’t so interested in
infection control, unless it related to a specific problem in their
department, [like] dealing with an outbreak. We’ve managed to,
over the years, introduce things that people would have thought
maybe unthinkable a few years ago . So I think there is a greater
acceptance now of the importance of infection control than there
was. (Consultant microbiologist, Source 2)Formal structures and lines of accountability
A further positive impact of the performance management
regime was seen by some participants to lie in the establish-
ment of formal leadership and governance structures for IPC,
stimulated by legal and other requirements, so that lines of
accountability and resourcing were now much more explicit
and clear. Many different forms of accountability had been
established, including but not limited to audits of practices,
feedback of infection data on a ward-by-ward basis, and root-
cause investigations into specific cases.
Within this trust, if we have any bacteraemia e if it’s MRSA, then
that goes to the chief exec. But you’re expected to be accountable
for what happens to your own bacteraemia as well. (Consultant,
Source 2)
If we do have some sort of blip, we have C. diff summits which we’re
all called to and challenged on, and [we] would look at all our
cleaning records and so on. (Matron, Source 1)
Executive-level participants also reported that external
reputational pressures, including media attention, had helped
to propel IPC on to the agendas of organizational boardmeetings
and to ensure that IPC interventions were explicitly resourced.
The pressure [to improve IPC performance] is essentially because of
the [.] reputation of the ward, of the department, of the hospital.
(Executive team member, Source 1)IPC as a collective responsibility
One of the especially positive effects of performance
management of HCAI reported by participants was a new sense
of acceptance of the importance of IPC and the need for it to
be a collective responsibility: IPC had become increasingly
understood as requiring everyone’s co-operation and support.
Ownership [of IPC tasks] for more people, and the understanding
that it matters, what they’re doing. It’s got to be everyone’s
problem. (Matron, Source 1)
Over the past seven to eight years, [we have] made them realise
that infection control is not the infection control team’s re-
sponsibility alone. It is everyone’s responsibility. Take ownership,
be accountable, and act on failures. And we help and support and do
the surveillance constantly, that’s our role. (Consultant, Source 2)Data to drive improvement
Surveillance of infection, stimulated by both national data
collection programmes and local audits, was reported by
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was a normalized aspect of routine work. Again, positive
consequences included new recognition of HCAI problems that
had previously remained obscured, identification of where
organizations were performing poorly in comparison with peer
organizations, and the ability to monitor improvement.
About four years ago or so they had a big problem in MRSA bacter-
aemias, I think it was it was quite bad compared to some of the
other [hospitals]. (Infection control nurse, Source 2)
Surveillance data were also seen by participants as having
value in motivating frontline improvement. Multiple methods
of making data available were described including charts,
dashboards, and public displays. Data were used in positive
ways to encourage and reward staff and to instil a sense of
professional pride.
The cleaner that I spoke to [.] said, ‘before I started their statistics
weren’t very good, now we’re always 99, 100% and never drop
below that’. And she took me out and showed the certificate she’d
put out by the families’ waiting room which acknowledged her for
good performance. (Observations, Source 2)
We developed and introduced an infection control accreditation
programme, and to be accredited, the ward has to work through a
series of standards. Their accreditation is judged by an infection
control nurse ultimately, and they’re really proud, and that’s driven
really good practice. (Executive team member, Source 1)Negative impacts of performance management
Though externally driven performance management was
recognized to have generated pressures to reduce HCAIs, it was
not experienced by participants as wholly benign. It was re-
ported to have produced a range of unwanted consequences
including tunnel vision, a culture of fearfulness, and the
introduction of conflict and tension into working relationships.
Tunnel vision
Participants suggested that risks arose when performance
management regimes targeted only specific infections (such as
MRSA), or specific infection routes e resulting in neglect of
other types of infections or of issues that staff saw as equally or
more important.
I think there are a lot worse things [than central line infections] e
wound-related infections for example e that emphasis should be
given to. (Consultant, Source 2)
We try and continue to improve performance on key organisms but
also [need] to be looking at a wider range of issues which perhaps
haven’t been tackled quite so consistently as the key headline or-
ganisms. That would be around things like surgical site surveillance,
urinary tract infections, hospital-acquired pneumonia/chest in-
fections. (Executive team member, Source 1)
Participants also expressed a concern that the drive to
produce data towards managerially set goals could easily
displace concerns about the patient.
I think the unfortunate thing with all of these issues often is that we
forget about why we’re doing certain things . you get the feeling
it’s actually not to do any more with the patients, it’s got to do with
your tick boxes, your numbers. (Consultant, Source 2)If we’ve lost sight of the fact that we’re here for patients, then
that’s a bit of a problem, isn’t it? (IPC nurse, Source 1)Culture of fearfulness
Therisk of sanctions forpoorperformancemeant that amajor
consequence of performance management was a culture of
fearfulness around IPC. In linewith the national approach of top-
down, mandated imperatives from the centre, organizations
often increased the managerial attention given to IPC, essen-
tially by reproducing top-down approaches of their own. Par-
ticipants described punitive managerial behaviours, which they
saw as being driven by externally imposed targets and the
reputational consequences of public reporting. Words such as
‘slap’, ‘whip’, ‘telling off’ and ‘disciplinary’ recurred in the
interviews:
So if I get one C. diff in ITU the [organization] board is down on me
. yeah, they come down very heavily on me, say ‘why did it
happen, how did you let this happen?’ (Microbiologist, Source 2)
If we’re not doing as well as we should be doing [.] then we start
getting our wrists slapped. (Senior nurse, Source 2)
The effects of this culture of increased fearfulness were
multiple. In some cases, it led to generalized anxiety about data
and the purposes for which it could be appropriated. Staff were
concerned about the linking of performance data with personal
or financial sanctions, which they saw as impeding improve-
ment efforts and suppressing a learning culture. Staff recog-
nized that punitive performance management approaches
could taint subsequent quality improvement efforts even when
these were based on voluntary, collaborative principles.
This [organization] will do a root cause analysis if there is a bac-
teraemia and [.] they do feel like a witch-hunt. The person who
put in that cannula or whatever will be given a good slap verbally,
and it is not the caring, sharing, let’s improve behaviour. (Consul-
tant, Source 2)
It’s all target driven, and if you don’t achieve your targets you get
penalised financially. It seems you’re not doing well, so we’ll take
more money off you so you can do even worse. It’s not like: well
what do you need and we’ll give you some more money and then we
expect you to improve. We get penalised for it. (Senior nurse,
Source 1)
If [staff] perception is that this data will be seized upon and used
against them it makes people much more reluctant to engage in the
whole process. (Consultant, Source 2)Conflict and tension
Despite the increasing acceptance of IPC as a collective
responsibility, some participants suggested that performance-
led initiatives tended to reduce rather than enhance co-
operation between teams and professional groups by trans-
forming IPC into an area of conflict and tension. IPC teams that
were seen to be heavy-handed or confrontational were
particularly resented, and there was a risk that IPC practi-
tioners could come to be seen by other staff as a threatening
presence in their wards or units.
Infection control initiatives usually boil down to a ‘you are terrible,
do something about it’ approach. You get a horrible e-mail, saying
like ‘you are crap again’. (Consultant, Source 2)
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they come on and are very demandinge you have not done this, you
will do that. I think the staff find it very difficult [.] so the rela-
tionship between Infection Control and staff in general is a bit
strained at times. (Senior nurse, Source 1)
My perception is that people panic when they see infection control
come, and that they’re being spied on. (Nurse, Source 1)
Tensions were also evident between the medical and
nursing professions more generally. Nurses often considered
that it was their responsibility to ensure that IPC re-
quirements were met, and they were answerable for audits
and for ensuring compliance. But some described feeling
powerless to influence the behaviour of their medical col-
leagues, and felt resentful of the enforcer role that they felt
obliged to assume.
The doctors are not the best at following the infection control
procedures when you’ve got the barrier rooms. They’ll walk out
with their gloves and their apron on and you’re like ‘oh my goodness
don’t do that!’ But what can you say? (Clinical support worker,
Source 1)
Why should it be up to the nurses to do it? Why can’t the doctors be
trained so they can do it adequately? If I had to do an aseptic
technique and I needed somebody at the end of the bed to tell me
what to do, I shouldn’t be doing it. (Nurse, Source 2)
Doctors, on the other hand, were often aggrieved at the
perceived erosion of their professional autonomy. Some re-
ported feeling humiliated and resentful at how they were
treated as miscreants and at what they saw as an assault on
their professional integrity and dignity. A particular source of
grievance centred on how the rise of managerial power had, as
they saw it, rendered them subservient to others who lacked
the appropriate knowledge and expertise.
You know we’ve got a lot of management saying what we should do
and shouldn’t do now and there is definitely a move to, you know,
take away professionalism altogether ... And I think if you want
somebody to be professional you teach them and you bring them up
to take responsibility for their actions. (Consultant, Source 2)Discussion
Our analysis suggests that externally led performance
management was broadly recognized by clinical staff and
managers in English acute hospitals as having raised the profile
of IPC and supported the establishment of organizational
accountability structures, with positive consequences relating
to clarity of goals and responsibilities, use of data, and
resourcing. Performance management approaches were not,
however, seen as wholly benign by participants. Significant
negative consequences were described, including tunnel vision
and the engendering of a culture of fear and of conflict be-
tween professional groups. Thus, though centrally driven per-
formance management approaches may have achieved much,
these findings suggest that more effort should be focused on
when and how it can most appropriately be applied.
The strength of this study lies in the synthesis of qualitative
data across two large datasets, including interviews with staff
involved in IPC at all levels, and its ability to combine data from
a specific clinical setting (intensive care in 19 organizations)
with a broader perspective across two organizations that werestudied in-depth. A limitation of the study is that our focus on
IPC did not include antimicrobial resistance, which has a spe-
cific history of management and regulation. The study might
have benefited from including more managers and clinical
perspectives from a wider range of specialties; our sample
construction in Source 2 was biased towards ICUs, where par-
ticipants may be especially focused on a narrow range of spe-
cific types of infections (e.g. intravenous-related).
In clarifying the role of performance management for IPC, it
is worth being clear about the features that appear to be
implicated in its successes and how they might be preserved
while minimizing the more adverse consequences. Chief among
the beneficial aspects of performance management appears to
be its ability to draw attention to problematic areas of practice
and to mobilize action.20 Participants in our study were clear
that external mandates had created a stimulus for improve-
ment. It appeared that the introduction of performance man-
agement had produced agenda-setting effects that converted
HCAI from a problem that had become rather neglected and
under-resourced into a social problem demanding a solution in
the face of intense public and political pressure.20,21 National
standards reinforced by the establishment and maintenance of
systems for monitoring had a key role in making local problems
visible and hence actionable.22
The positive effects of performance management described
by participants in our study are readily observable from the
empirical evidence. For instance, the introduction of
mandated surveillance for C. difficile allowed the scale of the
problem and any improvement over time to be assessed. The
data showed a peak of >55,600 cases in patients aged >65
years in 2006; by 2010, numbers had decreased by 54% to
>25,500.12 Similarly, reported MRSA bacteraemias showed an
87% fall from >7000 in 2001/2 to 924 in 2012/13.23 However,
further gains from surveillance and benchmarking are likely to
require attention to the formidable technical and resource
challenges (especially for some kinds of HCAIs), to the need for
data to be locally credible, and to issues of fairness and
comparability across different institutions.18,24
A second important feature described by participants is
clarity about organizational accountability for goal achieve-
ment. Hospitals are complex organizations characterized by
what is described in the regulation and governance literature
as ‘the problem of many hands’, which often makes it difficult
to determine who is responsible for what.25 Reform of systems
of governance has now made hospital management teams
responsible for addressing issues of infection control.7 As
described by participants, the increased managerial attention
given to IPC has had many positive consequences. But unless
carefully selected and optimized, managerially led goal-
directed behaviour may produce the tunnel vision effect
described by participants, known in the economics literature as
‘effort substitution’.16 Here, attention becomes narrowly
focused on the thing being measured, to the exclusion of other
equally (or perhaps even more) valuable issues. Setting a target
in one area may therefore mean that untargeted areas are
neglected: the use of MRSA as a performance target forced
hospitals to prioritize an infection that accounts for only 2% of
HCAI, and was implicated in outbreaks of C. difficile at Stoke
Mandeville hospital between 2003 and 2005 when this infection
was not subject to performance management.26,27 Thus, while
MRSA bacteraemias and other specific infections remain an
important area for attention, their continued status as a
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pathogens that are unmonitored e such as norovirus e rise in
rate and significance, or that other deserving areas for inter-
vention (such as antibiotic stewardship) are crowded out.
Other features of performance management are potentially
even more contentious. Public reporting was understood by our
study participants to have yielded some positive impacts,
though they were not uniformly good. Financial sanctions, on
the other hand, were much resented by participants. Consis-
tent with their views, there is little published evidence to
justify financial penalties. Two recent US studies examining a
non-payment policy found that it had no measurable effect on
central line infections or other HCAI rates.28,29 Further, finan-
cial penalties appear to increase the risk of gaming; some have
argued that infection rates may say more about willingness to
report than underlying rates of harm.30,31 Participants had
difficulty in understanding why fining an organization and thus
increasing its financial instability was the right way to promote
better IPC practice. An especially important consequence of a
highly punitive approach to performance management was the
creation of a culture of fearfulness. Participants reported that
it contributed to the suppression of a learning culture, made
people timid, and inhibited joy in work.
These findings suggest that better recognition is needed of
the potential and the limits of performance management. One
possibility for preserving some of the advantages of this
approach, while reducing its negative effects, may lie in
collaborative models that seek to promote infection control,
while simultaneously retaining professional support.32 Ap-
proaches based on professional communities may be especially
promising in their ability to address well-known problems of
attempts to change practice among professionals, since they
are more likely to be favourably disposed to ‘directions for
performance’ coming from their peers.33 An emphasis on co-
operation and norms of reciprocity rather than administrative
fiats and managerial instructions may help to enable collab-
orative activity to be maintained over the longer term and to
promote sustainability.34 In achieving such co-operation,
studies point to the importance of clinical and organizational
leadership, a collective focus on patient safety, and an
affirming emotional context.35 For instance, the iconic Michi-
gan Keystone programme appeared to achieve very substantial
and impressive reductions in central line infections in ICUs
without resorting to punitive measures.20
It has remained difficult to assess the potential of such
campaign or community-style approaches in England. First,
many of the initiatives, whereas they appeared to be voluntary
in principle, were run on government platforms and thus found
it difficult to escape the performance management taint.18
Second, some of the more genuinely voluntary initiatives
remained unevaluated. Third, it was virtually impossible to
detect the effects of any specific initiative because each was
taking place in a context of multiple other policy pressures for
improvement.36 Further programmes and studies should
address these deficits. Though performance management has
clearly had an important role in the history of IPC in England
and will continue to have some role in the future, persisting
with harsh regimes risks souring relationships and increasing
resistance to continued improvement efforts. Nonetheless,
there is a real risk that local teams may be left to flounder in
the absence of external imperatives that can bring pressure to
bear on organizational leaders.Acknowledgements
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